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Memories that have strong emotions associated with them are particularly
resilient to forgetting. This is not necessarily problematic, however some
aspects of memory can be. In particular, the involuntary expression of those
memories, e.g. intrusive memories after trauma, are core to certain psycho-
logical disorders. Since the beginning of this century, research using animal
models shows that it is possible to change the underlying memory, for
example by interfering with its consolidation or reconsolidation. While the
idea of targeting maladaptive memories is promising for the treatment of
stress and anxiety disorders, a direct application of the procedures used in
non-human animals to humans in clinical settings is not straightforward.
In translational research, more attention needs to be paid to specifying what
aspect ofmemory (i) can bemodified and (ii) should bemodified. This requires
a clear conceptualization of what aspect ofmemory is being targeted, and how
different memory expressions maymap onto clinical symptoms. Furthermore,
memory processes are dynamic, so procedural details concerning timing are
crucial when implementing a treatment and when assessing its effectiveness.
To target emotional memory in its full complexity, including its malleability,
science cannot rely on a single method, species or paradigm. Rather, a con-
structive dialogue is needed between multiple levels of research, all the way
‘from mice to mental health’.
This article is part of a discussion meeting issue ‘Of mice and mental
health: facilitating dialogue between basic and clinical neuroscientists’.1. Introduction
Your memory is a monster; you forget - it doesn’t. It simply files things away. It keeps
things for you, or hides things from you - and summons them to your recall with a
will of its own. You think you have a memory; but it has you!From: ‘A prayer for Owen Meany: a novel’ [1].
After psychological trauma, people can report vividly seeing the event unfold
again in their mind’s eye. For example, a person who was mugged at gunpoint
while working at the cash till in a shop might see in their mind’s eye vividly the
gun pointed at them, the sunlight glance off the metal, hearing the sound of the
safety lock clicking. This sensori-perceptual retrieval of an episode brings back
with it the intense emotional experience of fear and the thought their life is
about to end (for further examples, see table 1). These types of episodic memories
are known clinically as ‘intrusive memory’—a core clinical feature of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and described in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Table 1. Examples of intrusive memories from patients diagnosed with
post-traumatic stress disorder. Examples taken from Holmes et al. [2].
‘The body between the tube and the platform’
‘Being pushed to ﬂoor, them saying “get down” and being tied up’
‘Gun put to head’
‘He runs off and I look back to my house to see my daughter crying
and banging at door’
‘His face above me, laughing, laughing, laughing’
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2Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition (DSM-5) as ‘recurrent,
involuntary, and intrusive distressing memories of the trau-
matic event(s)’ ([3, PTSD criterion B1; p. 271]). A critical aspect
of this form of memory is that it springs to mind unbidden—
that is, against the person’s will. Thus, in the experimental
memory literature, intrusive memories are a type of episodic
memory that has been retrieved ‘involuntarily’ [4].
Involuntary retrieval is not restricted to episodicmemories.
Anxiety and stress-related disorders also involve automatic
physiological responses, triggered either spontaneously or in
response to (internal or external) threat-associated cues. For
example, a person may experience increases in heart rate,
muscle tone and perspiration when revisiting the location of
an accident or assault, or when reminiscing about the event.
Although one might not necessarily think of anxiety and
stress-related disorders as ‘memory disorders’, this paper
builds on the assumption that many of their symptoms are
involuntary expressions of memory of previously experienced
or imagined emotional events. Understanding what aspects of
memory are maintaining the disorder may provide a way to
progress much-needed treatment development.
To date, there is a good evidence base for the effectiveness
of psychological treatments for both anxiety (e.g. obsessive
compulsive disorder and social anxiety) and stress-related
disorders (e.g. PTSD). Specifically, the types of psychological
treatment recommended are forms of cognitive behavioural
therapy [5–7] and, for PTSD, also eye movement desensitiza-
tion and reprocessing (EMDR) therapy (e.g. [8]). While the
UKnational clinical guidelines [9–11] among others emphasize
the aforementioned treatments, it is also noted that psychologi-
cal treatment trial methodology has been a topic of debate [12].
Recently, some advances have been made with pharmaco-
logical treatments, specifically for anxiety disorders [13],
although less so for PTSD [14]. It will be of interest to examine
similarities and differences in mechanisms underlying effective
treatments, regardless ofmodality (psychological or pharmaco-
logical) [12]. Overall, however, it is clear that even our best
treatments need improvement: a substantial proportion of
patients do not benefit from them, or experience a relapse
after initially successful treatment (e.g. [15–17]). Furthermore,
effective interventions to prevent and treat traumatic stress
symptoms within the first hours and days after a traumatic
event are lacking [18,19]. Bringing novel insights from basic
science to the field ofmental health, to understandmechanisms
of change at a fundamental level, seems imperative to drive
clinical treatment innovation [20]. Such insights may, further-
more, point at ways to make promising interventions more
effective and widely applicable. Yet, translational science is
challenging, in part because there is a ‘culture gap’ between
basic and clinical science, with little interdisciplinarycommunication and collaboration, different language to
describe the same phenomena, different journals to disseminate
findings and thus limited knowledge of needs and discoveries
in the other fields [20]. Aside from this gap, there are the meth-
odological challenges associated with laboratory procedures,
and boundary conditions, meaning that pioneering attempts
to apply laboratory-developed interventions to clinical settings
risk failure.
We believe that challenges to translational science arise, at
least in part, from a lack of a shared vocabulary, which gives
rise to a misunderstanding of clinically relevant targets at one
end and insufficient appreciation of basic memory principles
at the other end. We argue that, to successfully bridge find-
ings ‘from mice to mental health’, it is essential to clarify
(i) what aspects of emotional memory are clinical targets
and (ii) when to assess and target these aspects.
We discuss the following questions:
— Why study emotional memory to understand anxiety and
stress-related disorders?
— How to define emotional memory and targets for clinical
interventions?
— How can the science of memory inform treatment
innovation?
— What are the challenges of translational science from mice
to mental health?
— How can neuroimaging in humans contribute to transla-
tional science?
— How could we facilitate the dialogue between basic and
clinical science?
2. Why study emotional memory to understand
anxiety and stress-related disorders?
Emotional memories are particularly resilient to forgetting
[21,22]. This is not problematic per se. Long-lasting memories
for aversive experiences can help us deal with similar situations
in the future. However, aspects of emotion-laden memories
can also form the basis of psychological disorders [23–25],
particularly when memory retrieval is involuntary. ‘Intrusive
memories’—typically of emotional events—are a form of invol-
untary recall andhave been theorized toplaya critical role in the
development and maintenance of various psychologi-
cal disorders [24–29], such as PTSD, and also including
depression [30,31], bipolar disorder [32,33], social anxiety [34],
agoraphobia [35], spider phobia [36] and health anxiety [37].
Involuntary memories may differ across disorders: intrusive
memories in PTSD replay trauma content from an index
episode; intrusions in agoraphobia have content related to agor-
aphobic themes such as being trapped—whether real or
imagined; intrusive memories in bipolar disorder can have a
future quality as if pre-playing a mania-inducing event.
Although highly specific to the given disorder, what is
common is their intrusive and imagery-based natures. Clearly,
not all involuntary memories are pathological [38]—involunta-
rily recall can be useful at times—but when the intrusion
contains highly aversive content, is unwanted and disrupts a
person’s functioning in daily life, then it is maladaptive and
can enter the clinical domain. For example, Syrian refugees indi-
cated that intrusive memories of traumatic experiences were
linked to concentration problems and functional impairment
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
373:20170209
3on tasks associated with adaptation to the host country, such as
language learning [39].
Here, we focus on memory in PTSD and, to a lesser degree,
anxiety disorders. In PTSD, patients typically experience
intrusive episodic memories of several distinct moments of
the wider traumatic event [2]. That is, intrusive memories are
not a replay of the whole event from beginning to end, but
rather of a few fragments within it—known clinically as ‘hot-
spots’ [40]. Aside from these sensory episodic (predominantly
visual) intrusive memories ([3, PTSD criterion B1; p. 271]),
people with PTSD frequently exhibit increased heart rate,
sweating and muscle tone in response to trauma-related cues,
as well as impaired extinction of such responses. In the
DSM-5, the diagnostic criterion B5 for ‘intrusion symptoms’
involves ‘marked physiological reactions to internal or external
cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic
event(s)’ ([3, PTSD criterion B5; p. 271]), while criterion E for
hyperarousal symptoms involves ‘marked alterations in arousal
and reactivity associated with the traumatic events(s) including
hypervigilance (E3), exaggerated startle responses (E4) and pro-
blems with concentration (E5)’ ([3, PTSD criterion E; p. 272]).
Both intrusive episodicmemories and heightened physiological
reactivity have been found to be predictive (among other fac-
tors) of the development of PTSD [41–43]. However, while
general alterations in physiological reactivity are common
across many disorders (e.g. most anxiety disorders), it is
trauma-related intrusion symptoms (particularly criterion B1)
that are the core clinical feature of PTSD (and acute stress dis-
order) and distinguish them from other disorders.
Interestingly, evidence from experimental studies also suggests
that, although physiological reactions in response to trauma
reminders and intrusive episodic memories frequently co-
occur, they do not seem to be associated with each other
[44,45], which has implications for intervention development
(see §3a).
As yet, it remains unclear whether it is better to focus on the
‘impact’ of amemory, oron theunderlyingmemory itself.When
an involuntary memory occurs, it can not only bring back the
sensori-perceptual, emotional, psychophysiological and peri-
traumatic cognitions described earlier (e.g. table 1), but it can
triggeracascadeof other,moredistal symptoms, such as further
distress, non-specific hyperarousal symptoms, negative mood
and cognitions, and unwanted avoidance. It is these cognitive
and emotional reports of the immediate and more distal symp-
toms that are the typical focus of cognitive therapy. However,
even exposure therapy procedures thought to focusmore proxi-
mally on the trauma memory involve approaches that are
thought to leave the original trauma memory unaltered [46],
creating a new inhibitory memory trace instead.
Here, we argue that focusing on treatments that target
the underlying memory more directly may be beneficial:
controlling the expression of involuntary emotional mem-
ories may prevent the occurrence of the other symptoms
altogether. Since the beginning of the century, a vast growing
body of literature suggests that it is indeed possible to change
the underlying memory trace. As explained below, the theory
of ‘reconsolidation’ states that memories are not necessa-
rily permanent [47–49], but can be updated, reduced or
enhanced, under the right circumstances. As we shall discuss,
this has inspired a whole new line of research looking at how
the plasticity of memories can be used to modify clinically
dysfunctional memories. But what exactly do we mean by
‘emotional memory’?3. How to define emotional memory and targets
for clinical interventions?
Studying memory is complicated by the fact that we cannot
directly observe a memory trace, but have to infer it from the
different ways it is expressed. In memory research, a variety
of behavioural measures provide different ‘read-outs’ of infor-
mation that has been stored, for example neural responses,
peripheral physiology, actions or action tendencies, (subjec-
tive) verbal reports or explicit tests of memory. These
responses are thought to be indices of some sort of underly-
ing neural ‘engram’, the memory trace, which supports
these responses. While in many situations different read-outs
converge, below we argue that a distinction between multi-
ple memory systems is useful and paramount to making
translational progress.
(a) Multiple memory systems
It is possible to showevidence of remembering in the absence of
awareness of that remembering. For example, the Swiss neurol-
ogist Clapare`de [50] concealed a sharp pin between his fingers
while greeting one of his amnesic patients with a handshake.
Even though the patient reacted with surprise and anger, she
forgot the encounter within minutes. However, when the neur-
ologist tried to reintroduce himself shortly thereafter, the
patient resolutely refused to shake his hand. She explained
her reaction by stating that she was afraid that, perhaps, a pin
was hidden in his hand, but even after repeated questioning
could not remember that she herself had been stuck with it.
While her brain was apparently able to form this association
between a neutral handshake and a painful consequence, her
brainwas not able tovoluntarily retrieve the event. The episodic
part of the memory had not been stored.
Clinical cases like these, substantiated by abundant scienti-
fic evidence (e.g. [51–54]), teach us that ourmind ismade up of
a constellation of agents that are, in principle, separable and
rely on semi-independent circuits. In cognitive psychology, a
classic distinction is made between ‘explicit’ or ‘declarative’
memory (what we can report, including episodic memory for
events and semantic memory for facts) and ‘implicit’ or ‘non-
declarative’ memory (including priming, reflexes and pro-
cedural memory such as aversive conditioning, motor skills
and habits) (for a review, see [55]). Declarative memory is
mostly subserved by the medial temporal lobe; most forms of
non-declarative memory are subserved by subcortical areas
such as the amygdala (aversive conditioning) and the stria-
tum (skills and habits) [55]. These memory systems can be
independently targeted [56–61] or damaged [62–65].
The idea that memory is composed of different systems is
not new, but has now been widely accepted [66,67]. Further-
more, work in both non-human animals and humans has
highlighted that certain types of memory can be modified,
while preserving other types. Yet, when translating these find-
ings to develop treatments for psychological disorders,
relatively little attention has been paid to specifying what
type ofmemory (i) can bemodified and (ii) should bemodified.
We argue that rather than the traditional declarative versus non-
declarativememory systemdistinction, the clinical focus should
be on the intrusive nature of an aversive memory [68], which
could, in principle, stem from both systems. A clinical interven-
tion should thus seek to target the involuntary expressions of
the memory (both declarative and non-declarative), without
intrusive memories of fragments
of the trauma
unwanted emotion-laden
memories that spring to mind
unbidden in form of sensory
imagery—sight, sounds, smells.
e.g. seeing  an image of abusive
piano teacher’s face and smell of
aftershave
conditioned responses to trauma
reminders
attentional bias to threat;
physiological reactions to internal
or external trauma cues.
e.g. jumpiness when entering a
classroom; sweating when sitting
next to someone; muscle tension
when hearing a certain tune
involuntary
voluntary
preserve!
control!
non-declarative
declarative
knowledge of facts or trauma
episodes
episodes and facts recalled
deliberately when choosing to
recount the trauma (such as for
legal reports).
e.g. address of abusive piano
teacher; some details of what
happened during the trauma
Figure 1. Diagram depicting how different memory systems may represent different aspects of the traumatic event(s), for example sexual abuse by a piano teacher.
In general, clinically beneficial interventions should aim to target the maladaptive involuntary expression of trauma memories (e.g. intrusive memories), while
preserving its voluntary recall (e.g. ability to testify in court). (Online version in colour.)
Box 1. Aversive conditioning paradigm: modelling involuntary and voluntary memory of threat associations in non-human animals and humans.
The classic model to study simple associative learning and memory is Pavlovian conditioning [69], which is well suited for
research across species [70,71]. In this paradigm, an initially neutral stimulus (conditioned stimulus, CSþ; e.g. a triangle) is
repeatedly paired with an intrinsically aversive stimulus (unconditioned stimulus, UCS; e.g. an electric shock), while another
conditioned stimulus (CS2; e.g. a circle) is never paired with the UCS. With sufficient CSþ/UCS pairings, the CSþ acquires
the same aversive qualities as the UCS and will elicit a conditioned defensive response (CR) on its own. After repeated
presentations of the CSþwithout the UCS, the defensive response usually diminishes, a process that is referred to as ‘extinction
learning’. In non-human animals, defensive responses are typicallymeasured byassessing the amount of freezing in response to
the CS, or avoidance behaviour; in humans, commonmeasures include skin conductance responses, acoustic startle responses,
heart rate, pupil dilation responses, action tendencies, UCS expectancies and subjective distress (figure 2).
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4compromising voluntary attempts to access the same infor-
mation or skill (figure 1). Voluntary forms of memory need to
be preserved, e.g. for legal reasons a person may need to
recount details of a trauma (eye witness testimonies and
asylumreports). The simultaneous consideration of involuntary
and voluntary retrieval of the same events should be a more
central feature of traumatic stress research.
Successful translation of insights from basic science to
inform clinical interventions (figure 2), depends on a clear con-
ceptualization of what type of memory is being targeted, and
how to model this. A widely used experimental model of
traumatic stress responses and other types of aversive learning
has been Pavlovian conditioning (box 1). Research using this
paradigm in rodents shows that it is possible to selectively
update one (aspect of) memory, without affecting another
[72–74], and one response system (e.g. reducing freezing to a
conditioned stimulus), but not another (alleviating suppressed
reward seeking after conditioning) [75]. Similarly, many
interventions based on this paradigm in humans show effects
on one type of memory read-out (e.g. reduced startle reflexesin response to conditioned pictures), but not on other types
(e.g. expectancy ratings of the likelihood of an aversive conse-
quence) (e.g. [58,76,77]). Thus, it appears possible that rather
than the whole memory, involuntary non-declarative aspects
can be selectively targeted. Such dissociations are crucial
when designing interventions for disorders such as PTSD:
which aspects of memory can we modify, and is the aspect
that can be modified, in fact, clinically meaningful?
Although aversive conditioning very precisely models the
formation of associations between environmental stimuli and
allows research across species, it does not model one of the
core symptoms of PTSD: intrusive memories of the traumatic
event. Involuntary retrieval of an intrusive memory is not the
same as a conditioned physiological response: it (also)
involves consciously retrieving a memory, i.e. drawing from
the declarative memory system. Relatedly, physiological
responses to trauma reminders are listed as a separate symp-
tom from intrusive memories in the DSM-5 [3]; see earlier.
Although a defensive response may very well be part of an
intrusive memory, it does not account for its image-based
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Figure 2. Examples of different aspects of trauma memory that can be targeted and associated research approaches along the translational research pathway(s)
from mice to mental health. The left column shows the different levels at which trauma can be modelled. The middle column indicates which aspect of the
(modelled) trauma may be relevant to target by an intervention, i.e. from a clinical perspective. The right vertical column highlights some of the memory
read-outs that can be assessed at each level, with measures of declarative memory and subject reports being restricted to human research, and invasive physiology
measures (such as structural at the synapse) being restricted to non-human animals. By and large most of the knowledge about timing and conditions for memory
updating comes from the lower level, i.e. experimental research in non-human animals. Note that voluntary memory recall (e.g. details of the trauma) can be
measured in humans, but is not the key clinical target of a treatment. DSM-5, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [3]; UCS, unconditioned stimulus.
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Box 2. The trauma film paradigm: modelling involuntary and voluntary memory of psychological trauma in humans.
The trauma film paradigm [79,80] has emerged as a well-established methodology to study intrusive memories of trauma, a
core symptom of post-traumatic stress and one that can be distressing in its own right. It uses film stimuli in the laboratory,
which contain traumatic content that can bring about intrusive memories subsequently in daily life. These memories are typi-
cally recorded in a diary, allowing for a frequency count of intrusive memories. Aside from intrusive memories, physiological
reactivity and neural activity as well as subjective distress can be measured during and immediately after film viewing. This
is similar to what is measured in conditioning paradigms (box 1; figure 2). Additional measures of voluntary memory include
free recall and recognition of details of the film. Therefore, this paradigm enables the study of memory for more ecologically
valid stimuli, but still within a laboratory setting, conferring additional experimental control.
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6episodic nature. Surprisingly, prominent neural circuitry
models of PTSD based on aversive conditioning findings do
not include mental imagery (e.g. [78]), which is a defining
feature of episodic recall of an event. This conditioning litera-
ture, therefore, does not directly speak to the dissociation
between involuntary and voluntary declarative memories.
An alternative experimental model with ecological val-
idity for traumatic stress is the trauma film paradigm, which
can model intrusive memories in response to viewing exper-
imental material with traumatic content under controlled
settings (for a review, see [79]; box 2). Emerging experimental
interventions based on this paradigm have shown effects on
one type of memory read-out (e.g. frequency of intrusive
memories), but not on other types (e.g. recognition memory
test) (e.g. [57]). Thus, it also appears possible that, rather
than the whole memory, involuntary declarative aspects
(e.g. frequency of intrusions) can be selectively targeted.
Although the trauma film paradigm can only be used in
humans, there are putative parallels with other types of
memory read-out at ‘lower’ translational levels (e.g. distress
ratings or psychophysiological measures in the conditioning
paradigms; figure 2), which tentatively allow for translation
of findings from basic neuroscience to simple real-life
trauma. Yet, this is an understudied area. Given that assess-
ment of intrusive memory frequency in humans typically
involves ambulatory recordings over prolonged periods of
time, research that directly compares intrusive memory fre-
quency with other read-outs is sparse. The few studies that
have assessed both physiology and intrusions in a laboratory
setting indicate, however, a dissociation: trauma film reminder
cues relative to control cues elicited both intrusive memories
and heightened physiological reactions (e.g. skin conductance
level) in one study [44], but the two measures were not associ-
ated [44]. Another study found more intrusions to film
reminder cues, without heightened physiological reactivity
(skin conductance and heart rate). Moreover, individual
differences in cue-elicited physiological responses were not
predictive of subsequent intrusivememory frequency in every-
day life [45]. To translate findings from one memory read-out
to another one in humans, future research should systemati-
cally examine under which conditions different read-outs
converge or diverge.
Not only is memory for a traumatic event likely to rely on
different independent systems, but its nature also appears to
change over time. In that light, the timing of any intervention
is crucial. That is, it is important to appreciate that memory
processes are dynamic, and that procedural details concern-
ing timing are crucial when implementing a treatment, and
again later when assessing its effectiveness (figure 3).(b) Multiple time points
The mind is not a video camera, automatically storing every-
thing that occurs in front of the lens in a way that is easy to
retrieve. To come back to the amnesic patient described by
Clapare`de, she may be perfectly capable of remembering her
neurologist’s name and recognize his face in the short term,
providing this information is actively rehearsed. Her failure
to explicitly remember the incident with the pin does not indi-
cate that she did not successfully encode the information.
Rather, the information appeared not to be successfully conso-
lidated in long-term storage, or lost in storage and therefore not
successfully retrieved. Many people may respond with terror
during a highly aversive experience, and will experience intru-
sions for a few days after, but only a few of them develop a
disorder like PTSD where intrusions appear to continue for
months or years.
A first time point to consider for memory modification is
the ‘consolidation’ period: memory does not reach its final
form during, or immediately after, encoding (unlike a video
recording), but is still malleable for some time after the event.
If altered during this malleable phase, the effects become
apparent not initially, but at a later time points, after the
memory has had a chance to consolidate [81]. The concept of
memory consolidation has been most convincingly illustrated
by experiments in which pharmacological manipulations
administered immediately after encoding left short-term (4 h)
retrieval intact, but induced full amnesia in the long term
(24 h) [81,82]. Post-encoding processes account for this dis-
sociation, as they induce the synaptic changes, including
long-term potentiation (LTP), that are necessary for the stabil-
ization of a memory trace in the hours after its acquisition
[83,84]. This means that memory is initially malleable,
i.e. there is the possibility to interfere with it.
While the duration of the consolidationwindow is typically
estimated to be in the order of hours [85], another form of con-
solidationmay continue indefinitely, withmemories becoming
more andmore integrated into cortical networks [86,87]. How-
ever, this so-called systems consolidation happens mostly
offline, when memory is in a stable state and not susceptible
to interference (figure 3).
A second time point to consider for altering memories
therapeutically is inspired by the theory of memory ‘reconsoli-
dation’: findings from basic neuroscience indicate that
consolidatedmemories can—upon their retrieval—enter a tran-
sient labile state, i.e. become malleable again [47–49] (figure 3).
During this window, a memory can be updated, that is, new
information can be integrated with a reactivated memory to
modify future retrievals. For example, extinction learning
within this window may diminish conditioned defensive
time
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only, no retrieval cue,
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by retrieval cue)
Figure 3. In the hours after an experience, memories are believed to go through an initial labile phase, before being stored into stable long-term memory,
i.e. consolidation. The purple arrow depicts different time intervals with respect to the encoding of an aversive episode. Green gradients below indicate the putative
processes of memory encoding and consolidation that occur during these different intervals, with systems consolidation referring to process by which memories
become less hippocampus-dependent and integrated into a wider semantic network. Recent insights from studies in non-human animals suggest that (certain
aspects of ) memories are not necessarily permanent. Instead, they may become transiently malleable upon their reactivation, rendering them susceptible to inter-
ference or updating before returning to a fixed state, a process referred to as ‘reconsolidation’. This offers a second window of opportunity to interfere with
consolidated memory (shown by yellow background shaded areas). Successful interventions (blue arrows) need to be timed such that the blockade interferes
with memory when it is in an active, susceptible state (indicated by the dotted yellow line)—either in the first hours after an experience, or at later time intervals
after a retrieval procedure (e.g. reactivation through reminder cues). In the first hours after an experience, blockade procedures may also need to be preceded by cues
that orient attentional resources to the event in order for procedures to successfully interfere with it, for example when the intervention is delivered in a context
other than the one in which the trauma occurred. Unsuccessful interventions, timed when memories do not yet exist, or are in a fixed state (i.e. not recently
retrieved), are indicated by grey arrows with dotted outlines.
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7responses more persistently than normal extinction learning, as
the safety information has become part of the original fear
memory [88]. The re-stabilization of a labile memory relies on
a postulated process called ‘reconsolidation’. This process is
dependent on de novo protein synthesis, and may be disrupted
through pharmacological interventions (e.g. noradrenergic
blockade [89]) or behavioural procedures that take away
resources necessary for storage of certain elements of the
memory (e.g. a competing visuospatial task [57]). To our knowl-
edge, the precise timewindow ofmemory (re)consolidation has
not been systematically investigated in non-human animals nor
in humans, though is assumed to be in the order of hours [86].
The duration may depend on memory system and protocol
used, and systematic work (e.g. using optogenetic manipula-
tions to reactivate memory networks, followed by
biochemical assays of plasticitymarkers) is needed to determine
when exactly the window opens and closes. Again, the effects
become apparent not initially (i.e. post-reactivation short-term
memory is intact), but at a later time points after the (updated)
memory has had a chance to reconsolidate [48,90,91].
The success of interventions that aim to harness principles
of memory plasticity is dependent on their ability to target a
memory when it is in an active, labile state. We have discussed
two main time points during which memories can be altered:
one that draws on theories of memory consolidation and one
that draws on theories of memory reconsolidation. Inherent
in this is the importance of a third type of time point: the out-
come of memory modification cannot be observed until the
memory has (re)turned to a stable state. This is important to
consider when assessing the effectiveness of an intervention.
Time has even further critical consequences: for example andfourth, a time gap of a few minutes may be needed between
a retrieval cue and a blockade (figure 3), to allow a memory
to destabilize (e.g. [88]). Fifth, pharmacological interventions
require a precise understanding of temporal profiles of drug
actions to target the memory when it is labile [92,93]. Research
is clearly needed to define optimal time points for intervention
delivery, which may be key to the success of a treatment.4. How can the science of memory inform
treatment innovation?
(a) Successful translations
The principles of consolidation and reconsolidation imply that
memory is malleable, either directly after an experience or
upon reactivation [47–49]. This has inspired exciting lines of
research aimed at modifying emotion-laden memory in
humans, with the hope to develop relatively simple-to-deliver
strategies that have the potential to interfere with involuntary
recall of memories once they are established, i.e. hours, days,
months or even years after the trauma (figure 3).
The first studies that translated findings in non-human ani-
mals [48,88,89] to humans used classical aversive conditioning
to induce a simple emotional memory [94,95]. These showed
that conditioned physiological responses could be eliminated
by presenting a single reminder cue (the CSþ) and administer-
ing a pharmacological agent (the beta-adrenergic antagonist
propranolol [95]) or a behavioural intervention (an extinction
procedure [94]) within the putative reconsolidation window.
These findings have been replicated a number of times, using
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8either the noradrenergic blockade [56,58,76,77,96–98] or
a behavioural extinction procedure [99–103], with effects
persisting for over a year (e.g. [58]) (for a discussion of
non-replications, see section 4b ‘Challenges to translation’).
Notably, these procedures only eliminated the automatic
reflexive fear response (involuntary recall) and subjective feel-
ings of fear, while leaving declarative knowledge about the
aversive associations intact (figure 1).
Another line of research, which has drawn on theories of
consolidation or reconsolidation (depending on the time
window), uses the trauma filmparadigm (box 2) tomimic com-
plex emotional memory in non-clinical volunteers (figure 2).
This has shown that the number of intrusive memories
can be reduced, for example, by directly interfering with the
molecular processes underlying memory consolidation at
the receptor level. Nitrous oxide, also known as ‘laughing
gas’, blocks N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptors which
are important for LTP. Individuals who inhaled nitrous oxide
for 30 min immediately after trauma film viewing, compared
with medical air (control condition), showed a steeper decline
in the number of intrusive memories over the course of
one week [104]. This suggests that across species, memory
stabilizationmay rely on similarmolecular processes (e.g. [90]).
Interestingly, a variety of interventions (whether pharma-
cological or behavioural/psychological or both) could, in
principle, interfere with memory stabilization. For example,
the frequency of intrusive memories can also be reduced by a
relatively simple behavioural approach—by performing
visuospatial tasks (e.g. Tetris; complex finger tapping),
during a time period when memories are assumed to be
labile (figure 3), i.e. either during trauma film viewing [105],
within minutes to hours after film viewing [106–109], or
upon their reactivation 24 h after encoding [57]. As expected,
the task was not effective when administered before film view-
ing [110], or when only the task was given without retrieving
the memory first [57]. The rationale behind this procedure is
that the task taxes visuospatial working memory resources
which are thought necessary to (re)store intrusive memories
with strong visual components [108], acting as a ‘cognitive
blockade’. In line with this notion, non-visuospatial tasks
appear to be less effective or have no effect ([107,109], but see
[111]). Crucially, when using a visuospatial task, across several
studies the cognitive blockade selectively reduced intrusion
frequency (involuntary recall), while leaving verbal and
visual recognition (voluntary memory) intact (figure 1) (for a
review, see [79]). As mentioned before, that a task could selec-
tively reduce the number of intrusive memories while sparing
voluntarymemoryof a traumatic event is desirable froma clini-
cal perspective: someonewould still be able to recall the factual
course of events that constitute the trauma (e.g. recognize the
perpetrator and testify in court), without having to fear being
overtaken by unwanted intrusions of the trauma in their every-
day life. Yet, the mechanisms behind this are still not fully
understood and require further investigation [112].
Recently, findings from conditioning studies in non-clinical
volunteers have been translated to emotional memory for real-
life events in sub-clinical populations (figure 2). Three studies
suggested that phobic responses couldbedecreasedvia reconso-
lidation-updatemechanisms ([59], snake or spider phobia; [113],
spider phobia; [114]). The procedure involved brief exposure to
the object of fear (long enough to reactivate the memory, but
short enough to prevent extinction; see below, section 4b
‘Challenges to translation’), followed by either apharmacological manipulation (i.e. the administration of
40 mg propranolol [59]) or a behavioural manipulation (i.e.
extinction training [113,114]). Themanipulation changed avoid-
ance behaviour into approach behaviour [59,113,114], with
effects lasting up until three-month and 1-year follow-up.
Importantly, theplacebo group and thepropranolol groupwith-
outmemory reactivation (i.e. nobrief exposure to the spider) did
not improve [59]. Also, in this case, different memory read-outs
of the fear memory diverged (figure 2): initially, no differences
were observed in subjective fear reports, but after three
months, the reactivationþ propranolol group scored in the
normal range [59]. This suggests that effects of memory modifi-
cation may require time to transfer to more distal symptoms,
possibly via mechanisms other than memory reconsolidation
(e.g. sufficient exposure to the previously avoided stimulus
without the concurrent physiological and behavioural fear
responses, leading to cognitive reappraisal of threat).
Findings from studies using the trauma film paradigm
with non-clinical volunteers and cognitive task interference
[106–109] have recently been translated to hospital settings,
testing the modification of real-life emotional memory in the
first few hours after a road traffic accident [115], and after trau-
matic child birth [116]—i.e. within the putative consolidation
time window. Both early phase (proof of concept) clinical
studies aimed to prevent the occurrence of intrusive memories
of trauma, by having patients play the computer game Tetris
soon after the event, as away to interferewith the consolidation
of the image-based components of the memory. In the road
traffic accident study [115], a brief reminder cue was given
prior to the cognitive task to orient the patient’s memory to
the accident, because patients were now in a hospital setting,
whereas the accident had occurred in another context. In
the traumatic child birth study [116], a reminder cue was
deemed not to be necessary—mothers were in the same hospi-
tal setting context in which the trauma occurred as for the
delivery of the intervention—and often with the baby. Both
studies showed, as predicted based on studieswith experimen-
tal trauma which used the same outcome measure [106–109],
that the intervention group recorded significantly fewer intru-
sions in a diary that they kept in the week following the
traumatic event compared with control groups.
Targeting simple phobias and recent real-life trauma
memory (i.e. a preventionapproachbecause this is before aclini-
cal diagnosis of PTSD canbemade)may be regarded as an early
step of intermediate clinical complexity, compared with labora-
tory research in healthy individuals on the one hand, and the
more severe anxiety disorders and PTSD on the other (figure
2). The more complex the memory becomes (e.g. older, or mul-
tiple events), themore important it is todefinewhat aspect of the
memory is being targeted and what read-out is used to assess
whether it is effective (figure 2), and to ensure the timing of
the interventionuses or induces periods ofmemorymalleability
(figure 3). Real trauma memories are typically stronger and
broader than aversive memories formed in the laboratory.
Case studies [117] and pilot studies [118], which combined a
memory reactivationprocedure andpropranolol administration
to block reconsolidation of trauma memories in patients with
PTSD, seem to be promising, though many more are needed
to understand potential limitations and non-replications (see
next section). Such small-scalework helps to get the right ingre-
dients to develop a new treatment. To test effectiveness of a
treatment once it is there, various types of randomized con-
trolled trials (RCTs) are necessary, but as argued below, at
r9present more mechanistic insights may be required before
investing in ‘expensive and time-consuming RCTs’ [117].stb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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While discoveries of memory plasticity fuelled excitement
about the potential to offer brief interventions for mental
health disorders with long-lasting effects, there has been con-
siderable scepticism as well, especially among clinicians [6].
A first criticism that has been put forward is that the effects
of the reconsolidation-update manipulation are usually
restricted to one response system (for a review, see [6]). How-
ever, we argue to the contrary that this can be an asset
therapeutically.While it is true that thismeans that an interven-
tion does not wipe out an entire memory or miraculously
‘cures’ someone of a full disorder from one day to another,
from a clinical point of view this does not mean it is not
worth investing in. The elimination of one debilitating symp-
tom may improve quality of life and functioning, and open
up resources to tackle (or prevent) other symptoms, as well
as have distal effects after time (e.g. [59]), and itmay be possible
to target different aspects of the memory one at a time.
Moreover, as argued above, for trauma it is an advantage
that manipulations are usually restricted to one response
system—permanent erasure of all aspects of memory for a
traumatic event is not the aim of evidence-based clinical inter-
ventions (figure 1) and could, in fact, bring about profound
legal, ethical and clinical consequences of concern [119].
More broadly, specifying clear, precise clinical targets
and memory read-outs allows one to systematically test and
optimize interventions along the translational pathway
(figure 2), which is impractical if one tries to treat an entire psy-
chiatric syndrome at once. It is well recognized that the current
classification system for mental health disorders, DSM-5 [3],
poses challenges for research owing to ongoing debate about
the precise symptoms that constitute a given disorder
and the overlapping symptoms across different disorders
[120–122]. Thus, a ‘precision focus’, focusing on one symptom
rather than a whole disorder, may be more helpful when con-
sidering the aetiology of disorders. Indeed, arguably, it is the
confusion that arises when talking about syndromes rather
than symptoms that can stagnate scientific progress across
various areas of mental health.
Second, scepticism has been fuelled by the fact that initial
attempts to apply procedures in the clinic have been difficult
to replicate. For example, the initial finding that trauma cue
evoked physiological responding could be reduced following
a pharmacological procedure that was postulated to tap into
reconsolidation mechanisms [118,123] was not replicated in a
follow-up study [124]. It should be noted that both studies
had several important limitations, such as small sample
sizes [118,124] and lack of control groups for either the
effects of reactivation [118] or general drug effects [124]. It
is important to follow this up and delineate boundary con-
ditions that arise during the complexity of clinical
translation. Failed replications are not unique to clinical set-
tings: pharmacological [125] and extinction procedures
within the reconsolidation window [97,126–129] have some-
times not replicated—though note that there are more
successful replications than non-replications. Furthermore,
there is evidence that the procedure does not work strongly
enough to eliminate all involuntary recall for everyone
[115,130]. Occasional (or partial) non-replications are to beexpected at this early stage and yield important clues to
direct future lines of research.
An important question is whether studies that failed to
find an effect managed to actually trigger reconsolidation.
Experimental studies have highlighted so-called boundary con-
ditions—circumstances under which memory updating cannot
take place (for a review, see [6]). The first one is cue and context
specificity: the reminder situation that is used to reactivate the
memory may need to be identical to the encoding situation
[73], which may be difficult to achieve in clinical practice. How-
ever, other experimental studies have found effects of memory
modification extending from one reactivated element to other
elements of a compoundmemory [74], to similar—but not iden-
tical—stimuli, including imagined threat events [76,77], and to
persist across contexts [77,88]. Furthermore, the finding that
interventions in sub-clinical populations were successful in
contexts other than the original encoding contexts [59,115]
suggests that this is not such an issue, as long as the targeted
memory system is sufficiently engaged. Another boundary
condition is the finding that reactivation of a memory is
necessary, but not sufficient, to destabilize a memory. Whether
or not a memory trace is destabilized may, at least partly,
depend on whether there is something to be learned,
i.e. whether novel or conflicting information requires an
update [56,96,98,131,132], highlighting a potential evolutionary
function of reconsolidation mechanisms [86,133]. This may be
governed by prediction error, i.e. a mismatch between what is
expected and what occurs (for a computational account of
when and howpredictionmay play a role inmemory updating,
see [134]). For example, one study [56] showed that in the case
that a certain stimulus (CS) always predicted a shock (UCS), a
single unreinforced presentation of the CS led to a violation of
predictions and triggered memory destabilization. However,
in the case of uncertainty (e.g. the stimulus was only reinforced
in 50% of the trials during encoding), more unreinforced trials
were needed to create a mismatch with what was expected
[56]. Similarly, older and stronger memories may require
additional retrieval procedures for updating to take place
(e.g. [135,136]), as do individual differences such as exposure
to chronic stress and high trait anxiety [130,137].
Thus, the optimal timings (see the earlier section (3b)
‘Multiple time points’) and duration of the reactivation pro-
cedure are likely to depend on the precise encoding history,
with more ambiguous memories possibly requiring more con-
flicting information, longer durations or possibly multiple
retrieval instances. Yet, longer and repeated retrievals of a
memory bear the risk of initiating extinction learning (which
involves the creation of a new, inhibitory memory trace [46])
instead of memory destabilization. When this happens, no
updating appears to take place [98,138–140]. Some clinical
pilot studies [118,123,124] have used script-driven imagery
for the reactivation of the trauma memory, similar to EMDR-
like treatments: the question is whether the method of retrieval
used in these treatments (prolonged, and with no obvious vio-
lation of expectancy) would have triggered reconsolidation, or
instead extinction learning. Furthermore, memory read-outs
during an intervention should not be mistaken for clinical tar-
gets. For example, a clinician may be inclined to continue a
reactivation procedure until a decline in physiological arousal
or subjective distress in response to trauma cues is observed.
Yet, such a focus on acute fear relief may be counterproductive,
and by inducing extinction learning, in fact prevent modifi-
cation of the original trauma memory [98,138–140]. This
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suggesting that therapists should not merely rely on seeing
direct within-session change, but should prioritize capturing
longer-term effects, i.e. after their therapy session has ended.
This touches on an important point: we do not currently
have an index for memory destabilization or reconsolidation,
other than inferring it retrospectively from the strength of
memory recall. But this is essentially circular: ifwe observe a be-
havioural change, we infer that the memory was modified; if
not, we conclude that some of the criteria for updating were
not met. While, in an experimental setting, overt expectancies
have been used to indicate at a group level whether memory
destabilizationwasachieved [56], this indexmaynotbesensitive
enough to apply in real time on an individual level, as patients
may not always be able to voice what they fear and what
event violates their expectation. What we need is a memory
read-out for offline processes that underlie memory plasticity.
5. How can neuroimaging in humans contribute
to translational science?
Neuroimaging—especially (functional) magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI)—has been frequently used for studying
memory processes because of the possibility to predict which
elements of an encoding episode will later be remembered
and which will later be forgotten. So-called subsequent
memoryparadigms [141] haveyielded severalmarkers that pre-
dicted the later voluntary recollection of information [142], or
the involuntary retrieval of experimental trauma [143–145].
Recent conditioning studies showed that patterns of neural
activation during encoding can also be used to predict the
long-term expression of involuntary non-declarative memory
(i.e. physiological responses to conditioned stimuli) [146,147].
Furthermore, neuroimaging has been used to study memory
reactivation and offline consolidation processes directly, with-
out having to interfere with them [148–152]. Perhaps, in time,
techniques such as fMRI could help us capture critical time
frames for memory updating—a process for which no other
read-out exists. Such a read-out may not be feasible for use in
clinical practice (yet), but it would allow us to test out pro-
cedures in real time that trigger memory destabilization,
without having to retrospectively infer it from behaviour.
Another way that neuroimaging could advance transla-
tional science is by checking whether neural circuitries
underlying a certain read-out ofmemory (e.g. startle responses)
are comparable across species, or across non-clinical and clinical
human populations. If so, there is stronger theoretical reason to
translate interventions that target that read-out in non-human
animals to humans, and eventually to clinical populations. If
not, it may be necessary to go back a step and focus on a differ-
ent read-out, until these ‘intermediate phenotypes’ yield
sufficient overlap to proceed. By covarying different memory
read-outs within and across different translational levels
(figure 2), we may be able—in a ‘Sudoku’ way—to bridge
gaps across paradigms and species. Neuroimaging could
provide a valuable tool to build these bridges.
6. How could we facilitate the dialogue between
basic and clinical science?
Harnessing the science of memory plasticity seems promising
for the innovation of treatments to control the expression ofunwanted emotional memories. Yet, to capture emotional
memory in its full complexity, including its malleability and
its context-dependent activation, science cannot rely on a
single method, species or paradigm. Indeed, work on
memory updating, including reconsolidation, has been con-
ducted in different species (e.g. crabs, mice, rats and humans),
different paradigms (e.g. classical context and cue conditioning,
trauma film paradigm, as discussed here, but also operant con-
ditioning, motor tasks) and different modalities (vision,
audition and olfaction). A constructive dialogue between differ-
ent levels of research is difficult as long as clinicians do not
familiarize themselves with basic science, and scientists do
not go beyond formulating the implications of their findings
as merely ‘offering opportunities for the treatment of disorder
‘X’’. Both sides need to communicate and bear the challenges
that will ensue in order to make progress [20]. Here, we end
with two recommendations.
1. Across translational steps, it is important to have a clear
conceptualization of what aspect of memory is being tar-
geted (or not) and how different memory systems map
onto core clinical symptom(s).
Scientists need to be clear what memory system they are
assessing and manipulating in their experiments, and how
it links to clinical phenomena (figure 2). Clinicians, in turn,
need to feedback which clinical phenomena are most relevant
to target and are core to a given disorder. For precision, it can
be an advantage to focus on one symptom instead of a whole
disorder, because it is virtually impossible to model a com-
plete syndrome in the laboratory, especially when there is
less clinical consensus than desirable about how symptoms
should be clustered in the first place.
2. It is important to appreciate that memory encoding and
retrieval refer to dynamic constructs and that many aspects
of timing are crucial, bothwhendesigning and implementing
an intervention, and when assessing its effectiveness.
Memory is not permanent, but can be updated (figure 3).
A range of factors determine whether updating will actually
take place. Factors that need to be taken into consideration for
treatment include the time since the traumatic event (e.g.
immediately post-trauma or later), the time of diagnosis/
symptom assessment relative to the intervention (memory
read-out), the duration of the consolidation window as well
as the reconsolidation window, and the similarities between
encoding situations and retrieval cues. To systematically
establish timing parameters for an intervention and avoid
circular reasoning, an independent (real-time) read-out of
memory susceptibility is urgently required. Neuroimaging
may be a promising tool to provide such a read-out and
validate translational steps across different levels (figure 2).
With the challenges raised here, one can imagine that it is
demanding during the treatment of established emotional
memories to define various key parameters of an intervention,
including (i) what retrieval cue represents the key aspect of the
trauma memory that needs to be changed, (ii) how to present
this retrieval cue to destabilize a memory, (iii) how to select
an intervention to interfere with a destabilized memory,
(iv) how to find the optimal timings to deliver such an interven-
tion, and (v) how to tailor treatment to an individual, i.e. taking
into account that the stimulus or procedure that triggers
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others. It should be noted that some of these challenges (e.g.
selecting appropriate retrieval/reminder cues) do not exclu-
sively apply to (re)consolidation-based treatments, but also
apply to existing psychological treatments that seek to reduce
established trauma symptoms (e.g. exposure therapy and ima-
gery rescripting). Rather than setting challenges aside as
definite boundary conditions, we are actually encouraged by
the rapid accumulation of knowledge that is advancing our
insights about necessary and optimal conditions for effective
memory modification. In turn, ‘back-translation’ studies of
effective procedures, in practice, may yield invaluable cues
for basic research. We think that further progress can be
made by investing in frameworks that reduce obstacles in the
translational path from mice to mental health.
An effective dialogue to facilitate translational research is
dependent on regular meetings and funding opportunities
that allow memory scientists to consult with clinicians and
vice versa. Scientists often seem unaware that evidence-based
psychological treatments target processes of emotional learning
and memory. Similarly, experimental work in the laboratory
seems abstract and remote to clinicians working with patients
with complex trauma.A constructive dialogue is not just impor-
tant for the field of PTSD and anxiety—maladaptive emotional
memory is core to many other psychological disorders. A focus
on transdiagnostic processes and single symptoms opens up
new opportunities for precision compared with a focus on full
disorders. For example, intrusive memories occur frequently
in depression [30] and in substance-use disorders (albeit with
different content), while cue-induced responses (e.g. craving,
approach tendencies evoked by drug paraphernalia) can bereduced by similar reconsolidation-update manipulations as
those used in phobias [153,154].
If memory is like amonster carrying traumatic information,
it may be time to tame it. A first step is to familiarize ourselves
with its many heads, each responding to its own triggers and
each producing its own sights and sounds. We may come to
realize that not all of the heads are ugly and not all of the
sounds are terrifying. We can live with the monster, as long
as it is not jumping out unexpectedly, carrying the negative
emotions, physical stress and sensori-perceptual fragments
that impair functioning.
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